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Origin and Dismeasure: the Thought of Sexual Difference in 
Luisa Muraro and Ida Dominijanni, and the Rise 
of Post-Fordist Psychopathology
Andrea Righi*
You can’t measure the efficacy of a movement 
using the values against which it was born.
(I. Dominijanni)
Abstract
In Pensiero Vivente (2010), Roberto Esposito investigates the issue of origin 
as a crucial axis of inquiry for Italian philosophy. His acute reconstruction of 
Italian philosophical thought, however, dedicates little attention to feminism 
and to the philosophies of those who carry out the labor of procreation and 
reproduction. This essay reframes the problem of origin from the point of view 
of the maternal, exploring the thought of sexual difference in the work of two 
prominent militants of the Diotima philosophical Community: Luisa Muraro 
and Ida Dominijanni. The aim is twofold: study how the notion of the maternal 
symbolic can be understood as furthering Jacques Lacan’s construction of the 
feminine; show how the socio-psychological transformations produced by 
post-Fordism call for a rethinking of some of the basic assumptions of the 
maternal symbolic, particularly the notion of fixation.
Keywords: Maternal Symbolic, Sexual Difference, Formulae of Sexuation, 
Fixation, Hysteria and Psychosis, post-Fordism.
In his last work Pensiero vivente: origine e attualità della filosofia italiana 
(2010), Roberto Esposito argues that, beginning at least with Machiavelli, a 
constitutive trait of Italian philosophy consists in bypassing the “necessary 
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turn seems capable of “affirmation only through negation,” as if “once having 
tied the possibility of thought, and thus of action, to the transcendental nature 
of language, philosophical experience was continuously sucked into the same 
entropic gorge that intends to escape.”1 In this perspective, the source of any 
space of order –language, society and so on– vanishes into the dark night of 
negativity. According to Esposito, this is the typical retrospective effect of an 
“immunizing logic” that, protecting the coherence of a system “against the 
self-dissolutive risk of the partaking-in-the-commune,” usually “characterizes 
origin –originary community– in utterly negative terms, i.e. elemental chaos 
or the state of nature, so as to determine the necessity of its barring.”2 The best 
Italian philosophy instead is characterized by a living-thought that critically 
engages the origin and draws from it not a paralyzing and static perspective, 
but the energy typical of beginning (cominciamento) and its originating force. 
Looking at Italy from a distance—not only at its society, but also at is 
cultural production –one thing that continuously strikes me is how the 
country enjoys falling into a provincial image of itself. This is a common 
phenomenon. Under the gaze of foreign eyes people tend to reenact an 
exaggerated representation of their autochthony. Although Esposito’s 
idea of distinguishing Italian philosophy as driven by the problem of life 
seems a simple and thus brilliant intuition, one may think that it runs the 
abovementioned risk. Especially in the US context, it risks, in other words, 
attaching to the various philosophies produced in the peninsula the typical 
flavor of italianness that is so successful abroad: the vigorous, quasi-animal 
but charming and innocuous representation that Hollywood Academy usually 
welcomes. 
Here, however, we should avoid the benevolent critique that dismisses 
this philosophical attempt simply because it exoticizes an irreducible form 
of cultural production. As a matter of fact, we should read the expected 
reproach of essentialism on the backdrop of an ideology, constructivism, 
that maintaining that whatever exists is constructed and mediated socially 
forecloses materiality and its dialectics. Contrary to what it seems, this sort of 
provincialization of Italian philosophy should be taken instead to its extreme 
degree. In other words, today’s task is showing how its marginality, or 
particularity, has deep social motives and in fact captures a specific historical 
configuration of modern biopolitics. As our times are marked by subsumption 
of the whole personhood in the work process –think of cognitive work or the 
care work typical of the sphere of reproduction– it is precisely this biopolitical 
1 R. Esposito, Pensiero vivente. Origine e attualità della filosofia italiana, Einaudi, Tori-
no, 2010, p. 9. From here on all translations from Italian are mine.
2 Ibidem, p. 247.
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configuration that brings the issue of life (and its origin) to the foreground.3 
Thus divesting Italian philosophy of its supposed claims of universality 
and framing it from the specific angle of the presentness of origin and its 
amorphous threat-force is an audacious enterprise, one that could free Italian 
philosophers from the traditional imperative of writing first and foremost 
historiography.4 
In his genealogy of this philosophy of life, one current of thought that 
Esposito hastily mentions is feminism. I would argue that far from being 
just another example of Italian living-thought, the voices that constitute the 
plurality of Italian feminisms disclosed the precondition for that very practice. 
In other words, their different and autonomous theoretical stance should have a 
sort of logical precedence over any genealogy of Life-Philosophy. Isn’t in fact 
the patriarchal order established precisely on a set of (immunizing) devices 
that neutralize and dominate the specific feminine power of procreation? Isn’t 
patriarchy a macroscopic case of excluding inclusion typical of the dialectic 
of immunization?5 To put it in straight materialist terms: as the main agents 
of the work of reproduction, women inhabit a concrete social-natural ambit 
where capital and labor fight over a strategic item: the production of life—
what Marx called labor power. This is why groups like Lotta Femminista, a 
neo-Marxist branch of Italian feminism, investigated the family as a (hidden) 
center of production of labor-power, disclosing how the latter constituted both 
3 Today’s centrality of life creates that paradoxical temporality at work in any evolutionary 
theory for which ideas elaborated in a distant past can be fully comprehended only in the now. Far 
from being a teleological ratio, this means that residues of the past acquire relevance for us in our 
act of interrogating them from our present condition. On the causes behind the turn to life see A. 
Negri, “The Labor of the Multitude and the Fabric of Biopolitics,” Mediations 2 (2008), pp. 8-25; 
A. Righi, Biopolitics and Social Change in Italy: From Gramsci to Pasolini to Negri Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2011); P. Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude, Semiotext[e], New York, 
2004). 
4 The weight of tradition and the typical Crocean approach to culture force Italian phi-
losophy departments to work almost exclusively on the history of philosophy. In this sense, the 
prominence of life and the thought it generates can be innovative only insofar as this perspective 
maintains a clear non-idealistic direction. That is, if it does not fall into the trap of constructing 
a positive (laudatory) representation and instead stares at the different material developments 
that are produced. Thus in drawing a genealogy of living-thought, one must also be keen to fore-
ground its reactionary degenerations. Consider for instance the group of intellectuals gathered 
around Strapaese who played a key cultural (and political) role during fascism as they constituted 
a strong, unitary image of italianness built on autochthony, local folklore and mostly violence. If 
one examines the editorials that Mino Maccari wrote for the magazine Il Selvaggio (the herald 
of the Strapaese group) or other writings by Giovanni Papini, it becomes clear how their similar 
attention to nature gave rise to a pure masculine affirmation of the right of force and violence in 
every ambit of life. It is in fact paramount to explore the power dynamics and the social conflicts 
that lie behind any presumably a-temporal, a-historical return to the centrality of nature. 
5 See M. Donà, “Immunity and Negation: On Possible Developments of the Theses Out-
lined in Roberto Esposito’s Immunitas,” Diacritics, 36.2 (2006), pp. 57-69.
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the matrix of their subordination and a platform for rebellion. Others, such 
as the Milan-based collective called Demau (De-mystification of Patriarchal 
Authoritarianism) privileged a psychoanalytical approach that deconstructed 
the patriarchal organization of the sphere of reproduction thus elaborating 
an anti-institutional and antiauthoritarian critique that was highly influential 
for the 1968 Movement. But it is probably the Diotima community in Verona 
that more extensively interrogated the issue of life and its origin from the 
autonomous perspective of sexual difference. 
Women’s relation to procreation is complicated. Although praised as an 
exceptional gift, historically their capacity to reproduce life has been regarded 
as the emblem of their oppression. It is presumably this vicinity with nature 
that made her inferior to man, as the latter, claiming for himself an exclusive 
role in public life, moved civilization forward. The Diotima community aimed 
at disparaging this powerful masculine discourse that precluded any positive 
instantiations of an autonomous feminine dimension. It did so by reverting 
what was considered a sign of inferiority into the locus of authority. So it 
engendered a theory and a set of practices that shaped a different configuration 
of psychic and social life that they called the Maternal Symbolic.6 
Looking at the thought of a prominent intellectual of the community, 
Luisa Muraro, in the next pages I will explore the ways in which the thought 
of sexual difference worked out key elements of Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
and thought through the problem of origin and its symbolic organization 
from a female point of view. In this sense, I will show how the notion of 
the Maternal Symbolic embodies a fundamental aspect in the deconstruction 
and critique of what Esposito calls the “paradigm of secularization” and 
its dubious “historical resolution of the originary nucleus” of life.7 Next, I 
will discuss the new challenges that the Maternal Symbolic faces drawing 
on the insights on Ida Dominijanni’s work. Her reflection on the notion of 
sexed subjectivity in light of the transformations of the organization of labor 
–post-Fordism– in the so-called society of enjoyment is crucial to sketch the 
criticalities of contemporary psychopathology as well as it most promising 
elements of conflict.8 
6 As Ida Dominijanni argues if “what a woman suffers from is being put into the world 
without a symbolic placement,” the political task becomes “speaking her sexual difference and 
giving it social existence.” See her “Radicality and Asceticism” Italian Feminist Thought A Read-
er, P. Bono and S. Kemp (eds.), Blackwell, Cambridge, 1991, p. 129.
7 R. Esposito, op. cit., p. 249.
8 See T. McGowan, The End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society 
of Enjoyment, Albany: State University of New York Press, Albany, 2004. In discussing Post-
Fordist psychopathology I kept in mind the thought of Massimo Recalcati as he expressed it in 
various interviews available on the Youtube channel: Psychiatry on line Italia. See Pol.it, Sept. 
2011, http://www.psychiatryonline.it/ital/current.htm. 
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The Social Split of Humanity and Sexual Difference
The translation of the power to procreate into a curse, into a pluri-secular 
form of disfranchisement and expropriation rests on a common assumption: 
the physiological difference between men and women. This difference defines 
procreation as a biological destiny for women, disciplining their processes of 
subject formation. Italian feminism turned around this notion and transformed 
it into a political practice. To fully appreciate the valence of this move, let us 
approach the problem of the difference between sexes from an anthropological 
point of view, and then move to its psychoanalytic significance. Here the 
question is: what is the most defining characteristic in the physiological 
dimension of sexuality across genders? 
The first distinction we must draw is not one between genders, but 
between species, that is, between the animal and the human. As Mina Davis 
Caulfield noted, “almost all our living relatives” show “physiological cues, 
triggers to arousal for both females and males that effectively limit sexual 
behavior to the periods of maximal probability for impregnation.”9 Humans 
instead do not experience a specific sexual season and copulate independently 
from natural cycles. The loss of a sexual season, that is, the loss of estrous 
cycles where female and male respond to sexual cues, is the result of the 
evolutionary change occurred in the transition from ape to man. A whole set of 
repercussions proceeds from this assumption and constitute the foundations of 
what is commonly known as sociobiology. Donna Haraway has demonstrated 
how historically this discipline “has been central in the development of the 
most thorough naturalization of patriarchal division of authority in the body 
politic and in reduction of the body politic to sexual physiology.”10 
Silvia Vegetti Finzi, psychologist and militant in the Italian women’s 
movement, stated that the woman is a “domesticated animal” (the absence 
of estrous is usually a characteristic that mammals develop in captivity). 
Furthermore, for a woman “the loss of estrous does not simply imply 
asynchrony with respect to natural cycles […] but also estrangement with 
respect to her own body and desire.”11 If for men the consequences of this 
primary alienation seem straightforward –the detachment from procreative 
9 M. Davis Caulfield, “Sexuality in Human Evolution: What is Natural in Sex?”, Feminist 
Studies 2 (1985), pp. 344-345.
10 D. Haraway, “Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, Part I: A 
Political Physiology of Dominance”, Signs 1 (1978), p. 26. See also the second part of the article 
“Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, Part II: The Past Is the Contested 
Zone: Human Nature and Theories of Production and Reproduction in Primate”, Signs, vol. 2, 1 
(1978), pp. 37-60.
11 S. Vegetti Finzi, “L’animale femminile”, in Verso il luogo delle origini, Centro 
Documentazione Donna di Firenze, La Tartaruga edizioni, Milán, 1992, p. 56.
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ends creates the conditions for a socio-symbolic experience of sexuality– 
for women the matter is more complex. Women’s sexuality is still molded 
by reproductive processes, but since she simultaneously engages in non-
procreative activities, it is also directed toward a non-specified goal. This goal 
is a point of great disagreement. If it is defined as the taking care of herself and 
her progeny, i.e. as sexual favors in exchange for protection, the conclusion 
is a social Darwinism upholding an implicit patriarchal view of society. If it 
is defined as an autonomous and liberating enjoinment, a neo-libertine call 
for authenticity usually is at stake. Is this ambiguity between sexuality as 
women’s self-determination (protection, pleasure) and contemporaneously as 
their over-determination (procreation) the genuine difference between men 
and women? 
Slavoj Zižek argues that at the bottom of Jacques Lacan’s formulae of 
sexuation –that is to say at the core of the positions the subject assumes with 
respect to sexuality– resides the problem of the primary difference that is 
implicit in the loss and/or lack of estrous. Lacan’s inquiry in fact examines 
the passage “from animal coupling led by instinctual knowledge, regulated 
by natural rhythms, to human sexuality possessed by an eternalized desire” 
qua the emergence of the symbolic order.12 This transformation cannot be 
articulated through a linear causal transformation. It is a derangement, a rift 
that breaks an established pattern. As with natural selection, this radical split 
illustrates the typical paradox of necessity. Necessity is always retrospective. 
At a certain point in time something new emerges, yet this emerging contains 
two contradictory characteristics: it must be thought as something that it did 
not exist before and, simultaneously, as something that was already posited 
and necessary for existence. This is the true non-teleological ratio of Darwin’s 
evolutionism: “contingent and meaningless genetic changes are retroactively 
used […] in a manner appropriate for survival,” thus “temporality here is 
future anterior, that is, adaptation is something that always and by definition 
will have been.”13
The extinction of a regulated, overdetermined sexuality qua reproduction 
becomes a lack, a gap that transitions humankind into a new territory. This 
lack, however, should never be thought as a limitation, but as an absence that 
gives rise to a new openness. For instance, the unhooking of the sexual act 
from its biological base opens up a great variety of non-reproductive practices 
that fuel “the development of shared and learned behavior and symbolic 
12 S. Žižek, Interrogating the Real, Continuum, London, 2006, p. 73. 
13 Ibidem, p. 99; this is also what John Bellamy Foster calls Marx’s logic of emergence 
of Darwinism, see Marx’s Ecology. Materialism and Nature, Monthly Review Press, New York, 
2000, pp. 230-236.
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communication.”14 In this new field both genders inhabit their biological base 
in a more reflective way. “Sexual pleasure –for instance– which originally 
signaled that the goal of procreation was achieved, becomes an aim-in-
itself.”15 Detached from rigid natural patterns, sensuous pleasure is now 
invested with a whole set of meanings and values becoming the object of 
social negotiations. Sexuality is thus already on the human side of the rift. Its 
biological base is thoroughly complicated, traversed by social constructions 
and symbolizations. 
I believe that this is the most natural element we can capture at the bottom 
of sexuality: the grafting on the biological base of sexuality as a social 
complex. It would be pointless to look for something more natural in the 
institution of sexuality apart from the grafting which retrospectively bears 
witness to its necessity. It is the self-positing work of humankind that in 
relation with (i.e. influencing and responding to) a complex and fluctuating 
environment experiences morphological changes. Morphology is self-causing. 
Sexuality is part of this set of self-transformative activities in dialectical 
relation with environs. Any archaic animal residue still informing women’s 
sexuality bears testimony to concrete historical arrangements. In a society 
where reproduction is crucial and those who perform that job are powerless, 
the pseudo-natural pressure of sexuality as procreation will hold sway. So the 
specific positions that males and females assume regarding sexuality –their 
different goals (pleasure or procreation) and the scrutiny of their imbalances– 
follow existing social organizations and their conflicts. 
The Lacan-Žižek Take on the Formulae of Sexuation
Historicizing the symbolic forms (i.e. patriarchy) that organize the 
biological base is central to the engendering of a new politics of sexuality. 
Adriana Cavarero, for instance, traced this occultation back to ancient 
Greek myths. Particularly in Hesiod’s myth of creation, she reads the mark 
of male domination “translating birth into the negative meaning of the 
beginning of death, the uterus into a container of evils […] and all those 
other figures of misogynous culture that follow on the centralizing of the male 
14 Caulfield, op. cit., p. 353.
15 S. Žižek, Organs Without Bodies. On Deleuze and Consequences, Routledge, New York, 
2004, p. 141. In a recent writing on this matter, Žižek further clarifies this point stating that in the 
derailment of sexuality, the latter “changed in its very substance: it is no longer the instinctual 
drive to reproduce, but a drive that gets thwarted as to its natural goal (reproduction) and thereby 
explodes into an infinite, properly meta-physical, passion”. This is how “culture retroactively 
posits/transforms its own natural presupposition” and “denaturalizes nature itself.” Žižek, “Hegel, 
Sex and Marriage”, Lacanian Ink 37 (2011), pp. 113-114. 
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as the universal subject of thought and language.”16 But the claim feminists 
make is that also the discipline that studied these symbolic economies, 
psychoanalysis, contributed to the preclusion of a genuinely direct expression 
and construction of women symbolic unity, i.e. what they called the Maternal 
Symbolic. The French scholar Luce Irigaray, who is very influential among 
the Diotima group, argued that a key concept in Freud and Lacan, the phallus, 
is nothing less than the masculine expropriation of the relation to origin and 
of the desire for and as origin.17 “We know” Cavarero argues “that corporeal 
facts […] are the raw material of the symbolic elaboration that expresses 
their signification.”18 Hence the task is to signify this sexual difference in a 
productive non static way. 
To show how the philosophy of sexual difference outlined the 
configuration of the Maternal Symbolic I propose to go back to Lacan by 
way of Žižek. The Slovenian psychoanalyst is in fact particularly interesting 
for us as he does not propose a monolithic rendering of Lacan, but rather he 
looks at his work as a “succession of attempts to seize the same persistent 
traumatic kernel.”19 As Žižek notes: “In so far as sexual difference is a Real 
that resists symbolization, the sexual relationship is condemned to remain an 
asymmetrical non-relationship in which the Other, our partner, prior to being 
a subject, is a Thing.”20 By recognizing the transcendental nature of woman 
as Other we deploy this asymmetry. According to Lacan, two different gender 
modalities exist that are expressed in his famous formula. The feminine is 
limitless, but at the same time not totalizable (not-whole); the masculine 
instead is universal and definite, but founded on exception (phallocentrism). 
Žižek argues that this symbolic placement crops out a factor elevating it to an 
absolute condition. This is what he calls “humanization at its zero-level” that 
is, “the elevation of a minor activity into an end-in-itself” that has the same 
features of a “deadly excess of enjoyment as the goal in itself.”21 Symbolic 
communication emerges out of this background as a barrier that mediates 
this form of jouissance without ever subsuming it completely. It is important 
to notice that this is a specific kind of “animalized” jouissance, an obsessive 
form of enjoyment that we will find also at work in post-Fordism. 
16 A. Cavarero, “Thinking Difference”, Symposium 2 (1995), p. 126. 
17 L. Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1985, p. 33.
18 A. Cavarero, p. 125.
19 S. Žižek, Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality, Verso, New 
York & London, 1994, p. 173.
20 Ibidem, p. 108.
21 S. Žizek, Organs Without Bodies, cit., pp. 142-143.
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Key to the formulae of sexuation is the “fundamental Hegelian paradox 
of reflexivity.”22 Žižek argues that “if the subject is to emerge, he must set 
himself against a paradoxical object that […] cannot be subjectivized,” that 
is “a piece of flesh that the subject has to lose if he is to emerge as the void 
of the distance towards every objectivity.”23 Men and women respond to this 
impasse in different ways and this justifies their different location with regards 
to Lacan’s schema. It is in seminar XX, Encore that Lacan lays out a complex 
topology, or logical space of sexual difference.24 Here Lacan begins with man 
in order to work out woman’s position. The masculine side of the formula 
defines a relationship between him as a barred subject and reality: $ — a. We 
said that the subject must emerge in opposition to an object. Žižek argues that 
this happens through the interpellation of another subject (an Other which 
is usually the mother) who addresses the infant. When the subject responds 
to this puzzling demand s/he establishes his or her conditions of possibility 
and, departing from his or her pre-symbolic state, begins positing him or 
herself as someone for somebody. This is the first step to initiate a process of 
subjectification that inaugurates the entrance of the subject into the symbolic 
order. Hence according to Lacan, and contrary to what we commonly think, 
we don’t begin as subjects, but as object for a subject, for somebody else. 
Fantasy is the proper name for this work that sustains subject formation, that 
is to say, for a procedure that offers a “way for the subject to answer the 
question of what object he is in the eyes of the Other.”25 Responding to this 
demand (the demand of the Other) is an activity an individual will carry on for 
the rest of his or her life. 
Yet as this asymmetry characterizes our subjectivity, it marks also our 
inconsistency. This means that the subject is hollow. In other words, inside 
our head (or our heart) there is no little replica of ourselves in charge of the 
operations, because we are born out of a request of/from the Other. This is 
why Lacan bars the S of the subject ($). This vacuous essence of the self 
reflects also the early perceptions that infants have as they begin to realize 
their individuality. In the so-called mirror stage, the infant composes his or 
her “dispersed erogenous zones into the totality of a unified body.”26 The 
symbol of this limitation, the phallus, delimits (or castrates) the subject 
22 S. Žižek, Metastases of Enjoyment, cit., p. 105. See for instance Moi Toril, “From Femi-
ninity to Finitude: Freud, Lacan, and Feminism, Again”, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society, 3 (2004), pp. 841-878.
23 S. Žižek, Metastases of Enjoyment, cit., p. 33.
24 See F. Regnault, “Introduction to Encore”, Lacanian Link 37 (2011), pp. 47-55; Ellie 
Ragland, The logic of sexuation: from Aristotle to Lacan, State University of New York Press, 
Albany, 2004.
25 S. Žižek, Metastases of Enjoyment, cit., p. 177.
26 Ibidem, p. 128.
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and in so doing it also provides the future structure of reference for his 
desire. It becomes a signifier of a signified that cannot be fulfilled. Here 
desire is articulated in both its transitive meaning, as desire for the Other, 
and its causative meaning, as the desire for the recognition by the Other. 
What is paramount here is desire’s relational structure. This rapport can be 
extinguished only when the radical difference between subject and Other is 
foreclosed as in the abovementioned case of the zero-level jouissance. 
Moreover, the response (fantasy) the subject fabricates cannot be taken 
as something positive either. In the formula ($ – a) the subject establishes 
through his fantasy a relation with the Other, which Lacan calls the object 
petit a. The object petit a is a sort of structural mechanism that feeds on itself 
comprising various level: “Objet a is simultaneously the pure lack, the void 
around which the desire turns and which, as such, causes the desire, and the 
imaginary element which conceals this void, renders it invisible by filling it 
out.”27 A good example Lacan uses to illustrate the structure of the object petit 
a is that of the book that goes missing from a library bookshelf. The book’s 
absence is visible and –if we take for granted the physical impossibility to 
retrieve the volume– it now constitutes its presence. Thus for Lacan, those 
individuals located in a masculine position are continuously caught in the 
reproduction of this phantasmatic object. As he writes, this man “is unable 
to attain his sexual partner, who is the Other, except insomuch as his partner 
is the cause of his desire.”28 But the cause of his desire is simply a fantasy, a 
filler of a void that cannot be filled. 
This vacuous matter is not proper to the male only. According to Žižek, 
it is in Encore that Lacan revises his previous position concluding that the 
symbolic order too is inconsistent. Prior to the 1960s, Lacan believed that “the 
Name-of-the-Father qua the central signifier […] guarantee[d] the consistency 
of the symbolic field.”29 In other words, the structure of reference constituted 
by the symbolic order was based on an exception, a principle ensuring from 
outside the coherence of the symbolic field. In Encore, however, he affirms 
that “there is no Other of the Other.”30 Here Lacan stages a negation that works 
at two levels. The first negation (there is no Other) implies that the symbolic 
order is not founded on a determinate distinctive element that defines it—for 
instance the famous Freudian idea of Moses as the non-Jew father of the Jews. 
The second (there is not Other of the Other) implies that the threshold of the 
27 Ibidem, p. 178.
28 J. Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality: the Limits of Love and Knowledge, Norton & Com-
pany, New York & London, 1999, p. 80. 
29 S. Žižek, Metastases of Enjoyment, cit., p. 173.
30 J. Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, cit., p. 81.
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symbolic is split open, operating as a fragmented border not defining what it 
is in and what is out, but rather generating an infinity of points.31 
It is at this extremity that we encounter the woman. As Lacan argues 
“woman is that which has a relationship to that Other […] in the most 
radical sense.”32Her position is characterized the very structure of the borders 
of the symbolic field, borders that rely on a groundless basis. Therein we 
encounter her epistemological superiority. Her position is expressed by the 
following formula: S – (A). She is not a barred subject ($), because she is 
not captured completely by the symbolic field. As we said she inhabits the 
zone of indistinguishability of the borders. Yet, as she replicates the same 
infinite structure, she is also in direct relation with the Other (A). Here the 
figure of the hysteric, as Žižek notes, better explains the female defiance 
of the symbolic inscription. Stormed by paradoxical requests, the hysteric 
personality is caught up in a masquerade that ultimately shows how behind 
these radically contradictory performances there is no subject. Thus the 
hysteric acts out the properly bottomless configuration of any subjectivity that 
is not subjected to the fantasy of object petit a. In Žižek’s interpretation the 
woman retains a fundamental epistemological value insofar as she constitutes 
a transcendental condition. Accordingly, any positive determination of her 
essence, what he calls “the pre-symbolic eternally Feminine” is useless and 
gives rise in fact to “a retroactive patriarchal fantasy.”33
In this regard Žižek but also other eloquent interpreters of Encore, like 
Ellie Ragland, maintain that, for however traumatic or fragmentary, it is the 
phallus that regulates the symbolic position “vis-à-vis difference.”34 The 
woman instead –and this is a productive and positive difference that Žižek 
censures– entertains a special relation to jouissance for, as she escapes the 
phallic function, she is also simultaneously able to “take a certain distance 
from the all of the master discourse.”35 Man, on the other hand, has access 
to phallic jouissance which hinges on some prop (the partial object a) that 
momentarily satisfies the subject only to make him begin his search again. 
This fantasy propels a series of attempts that are multiple, continuous but 
also determined and mostly serialized. On the contrary, whoever occupies 
the feminine position does not follow recursive phallocentric logic, but s/he 
operates on an economy of desire based on “quantitative infinity.”36 For Žižek 
31 Yong Wang makes a similar argument with reference to social system, in “Agency: The 
Internal Split of Structure”, Sociological Forum 3 (2008), pp. 481-502. 
32 J. Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, cit., p. 81.
33 S. Žižek, Metastases of Enjoyment, cit., p. 151.
34 Ragland, op. cit., p. 183.
35 Ibidem, p. 182
36 S. Žižek, Interrogating the Real, cit., p. 65. 
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this is a transcendental position, one that functions as a limit and does not 
allow the coming into being of a subject; so while he installs her in the throne 
of the transcendental, Žižek denies her access to a positive subjectification. 
Luisa Muraro: the Maternal Symbolic and the Function of Fixation
With Lacan and Žižek we flew high on the wings of philosophy and 
theoretical conceptualization. By paying attention to more concrete life 
experiences, the Diotima group asks instead a series of more basic questions. 
If we take for granted Lacan’s topology and the epistemologically superior 
position of the woman, is it actually true that she falls outside the domain of 
symbolic communication? Moreover, is it true that because of this peculiar 
relationship with the symbolic she becomes incapable of “free signification” 
and thus of expressing “a symbolic order of difference.”37 And most important, 
is it true that that deep, all-comprising love and tenderness of infancy all 
ultimately severed by the enigma of the Other and the following castration? 
My argument is that the feminist revision of the psychoanalytic framework 
is based on two fundamental points. One is historical and disputes the 
immutability of the symbolic order as it has been delineated. The second 
has a metaphysical objective and challenges Lacanian thought by taking to 
full consequences the scheme of sexuation. We may assess these points in 
light of the work of Luisa Muraro beginning from a very simple, intuitive 
question she raises. It regards the relationship between the infant and her 
or his mother, but what is at stake here is also the hidden structure that lies 
behind the transcendental priority of women. 
For what we have said so far, there seems to be a discrepancy between 
the symbolic as a structure that guarantees signification and the process of 
learning our native language as a concrete activity. Muraro points out that 
“we learn language from the mother or someone else on her behalf, and that 
we do that not as something beyond or at the margins but as an essential 
part of the vital communication we entertain with her.”38 In effect, even 
if language cuts through our symbiosis with the environment as a foreign 
medium and castration provides access to our future social interactions, this 
event entails a long period of apprentiship. But in Lacan, as well as in Žižek, 
this seems to happen in a transcendental laboratory where moves, responses 
and dynamics are determined by abstract laws. On the contrary, in everyday 
living experience, it is usually the mother who carries out this linguistic labor 
establishing an expansive relationship with the creature she gave birth to. This 
37 I. Dominjianni, “L’eccedenza della libertà femminile”, in Motivi della libertà, Franco 
Angeli, Milano, 2001, pp. 50, 52.
38 L. Muraro, L’ordine simbolico della madre, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1991, p. 42.
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is a powerful and vital dimension. Why does it have to be severed? Muraro 
does not refuse the reality of the symbolic, which is objective and historically 
true, but argues that these theorizations only show us the particular point of 
view of the masculine social order.39 Accordingly, the “symbolic order begins 
to be instituted in the relationship with the mother (or it will never be), and 
the cut that separates us from her does not respond to a necessity at the level 
of the symbolic order”40. 
The repressing or foreclosing of a maternal genealogy of signification is 
due not only to a historically male dominated society, but also to a lack of 
theorization, where with the term theory Muraro recalls the Greek definition 
of theorein, that is to “look at.” This incapacity to look at or show the logic 
and the role of a different Maternal Symbolic is what the thought of sexual 
difference strived to produce. Here we come to the metaphysical argument. 
I come to believe that the notion of the Maternal Symbolic that the Diotima 
group elaborates is in no disagreement with Lacan and the definition 
of woman as a non-whole; rather it represents a full development of its 
contents. Let us go back again to Lacan. As he notes the women position 
appears contradictory by standard logic only if framed in the context of a set 
theory based on a finite field. If the latter is infinite, however, “the not-whole 
[cannot] impl[y] the existence of something that is produced on the basis of 
a negation,” but rather it implies that of an “indeterminate existence.” The 
couplet “indeterminate existence” connects the idea of an open variability 
(indeterminate) to its concrete and individual actualization (existence). 
Indeterminate existence visualizes the idea of a split border, one in which 
the field, instead of being limited, grows as through a graph, or a series of 
variations. This is how, Lacan concludes, “woman is truth,” but as such “one 
can only half-speak of her.”41 Muraro articulates her full structure giving 
form to Lacan’s (precluded) truth by reconsidering the concept of fixation. 
Instead of an obsessive behavior caused to the persistence of an attachment 
to a libidinal level, Muraro transcends its pathological blockage rescuing a 
structural value, that of a principle able to organize the maternal dimension. 
Why does Muraro focus on fixation? Doesn’t this approach clash with 
standard feminist theory that depicts repetition and sameness as the typical 
results of phallocentrism? According to Muraro fixation does not exactly 
entail the repetition of the same. A different (structurally more fundamental) 
kind of circularity displaces the endless replacement of the object petit a. 
The concept of fixation is linked to substitution in such a way that in the 
former “something from our primordial relationship with the matrix of life is 
39 Ibidem, p. 46.
40 Ibidem, p. 44.
41 J. Lacan, op. cit., p. 103.
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kept” that actually enables any chain of substitutions.42 It is the permanence 
of an archaic trait that we inherited as infants: a presentness of the world that 
develops out of the first indistinctive feeling that newborns have before any 
proper symbolic individuation. In the pre-symbolic stage, this powerful and 
all-encompassing experience accompanies the subsequence individualization 
and actually funds the child’s capacity to relate with any ambit of his or her 
life experience. The radical point that Muraro makes is that our tendency 
to reactivate that configuration of being is precluded by the symbolic order, 
which allows its functioning only through the displaced object. But this 
attachment to the matrix of life constitutes an original horizon of sense which 
is necessary and that presents a clear maternal lineage. 
Going beyond the masculine symbolic, this capacity engenders, moreover, 
an alternative form of signification. We said that fixation implies substitution, 
but substitution here does not mean exchanging something for something 
else. This substitution is also “restitution,” for we never replace “the mother 
with something other from her.” But how is it possible? Don’t we reach a 
sort of impasse where the presence of the original blocks any growth, any 
change? Muraro argues that the mother has a “symbolic predisposition to 
substitution” as any “woman becomes mother while being capable of not 
becoming it, and while remaining still the daughter of her mother, so that any 
biological mother is already a substitute.”43 Hence the Maternal Symbolic 
takes the form of a plane in which the symbolic order represents only a 
regional area ruled by deterministic (phallocentric) sets of laws. The plane 
instead is the immanent field of possibilities of the phenomenal world. The 
difficulty in conceptualizing it, Muraro argues, can be “resolved if we think 
about a substitution without the replacements of the mother, according to 
the structure of the maternal continuum. This is possible because it exists a 
substitution without replacements: it is the language we talk,” Here words, she 
continues, “do not substitute other words, they replace things without putting 
anything else in their place”44. 
The famous opposition between metaphor and metonymy that Muraro 
rethinks in her work Maglia o uncinetto (2004) better illustrates this point.45 
The masculine symbolic order organizes its field and ensures coherence 
through analogies, through resemblances among different objects that refer 
back to a common denominator: the phallus. So substitution here means 
the return of the same (the phallus). The variants that grow in the maternal 
42 L. Muraro, L’ordine simbolico, cit., p. 56.
43 Ibidem, p. 54.
44 Ibidem, p. 62.
45 See L. Muraro, Maglia e uncinetto. Racconto linguistico-politico sulla inimicizia tra 
metafora e metonimia, imanifestolibri, Roma, 2004.
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continuum, on the other hand, follow a different logic, one which is marked by 
its sexual constituency. The woman relation to her sexual organs underscores 
the importance of interiority and contiguity –the lips of the vagina being here 
the primal referent. Metonym, in fact, follows “dynamics of the near and 
not of the proper, movements coming from the quasi contact between two 
unites hardly definable as such”46. Metonym brings together what is close, 
thus expressing relations, vicinities among things or facts that happen to be 
already there. Metonym, thus, provides a more open and differential economy 
which is horizontal and contingent. This is why fixation qua substitution-
restitution is compared to language, for it represents the deployment of what 
De Saussure conceived of as a linguistic system: an infinite syntagmatic field 
of associations in presentia. 
Within this phenomenal plane, subjectification bears no nostalgia for an 
original, because that origin is already inscribed in the fabric that sustains 
its form of life. Where psychoanalysis saw an empty whole, the blind spot 
of subjectivity, feminism discovers infinite fullness: the diagram of maternal 
fullness. Psychoanalysis in fact constructs the idea of the sayable, of what 
can be determined or better signified, basing its configuration on the 
inaccessibility of the symbolic order, the barred subject and so on. But beyond 
this limited field, there stands also truth (and Lacan acknowledged it) with its 
indeterminate configuration. Yet, this duality cannot be reconciled as we can 
look at truth only from the point of view of the symbolic. Feminism instead 
turns the argument around and discovers a differential consistency that gives 
back a material and expansive dimension of being where nothing is lost. 
In this perspective the figure of the hysteric changes radically. Hysteria 
is not simply the typical female masquerade behind which one finds the 
inconsistency of a positive subject. This fundamental gap actually shows how 
the hysteric is tied to the Other, her object of love, “as nourishment of her 
own sentiment”47. This Other is the mother. Yet being too close to her, the 
hysteric refuses any substitution. In other words, “she does not recognize that 
substitution is restitution.”48 The cure for this extreme case of fixation consists 
precisely in language. The talking cure developed by psychoanalysis, and its 
successive adoption among feminists through consciousness rising meetings –
in Italian presa di coscienza e di parola– was a means to practice a relationality 
between mother and daughter beyond the masculine occlusion. It offered a 
way of being together that was communal and differential like speech. This 
is the true meaning of the symbolic maternal order: not a limitation but a 
possibility to populate being, not simply a theory to give form to a socio-
46 Irigaray, op. cit., p. 111.
47 L. Muraro, L’ordine simbolico, cit., p. 59.
48 Ibidem, p. 62.
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symbolic configuration for women but its actual creative transformation as a 
living dimension. In conclusion, in the context of the patriarchal society, the 
maternal symbolic defined a political practice that dialectically turned what 
looked like a cause of oppression into a source of authority and strength. 
Post-Fordist Psychopathology, Ida Dominijanni and the Problem of 
Internal Rotation
The rise of post-Fordism brought forward new dynamics that put into 
question some of the principles of the theory of the Maternal Symbolic. The 
economic and the symbolic order usually go hand in hand, and this is all the 
more true today when the hegemony of a neo-liberal ideology coexists with 
the faltering of the Law of the Father and its symbolic order. The two are 
not disconnected. Just as the symbolic order of the Father, with its privileges 
and interdictions melts into thin air, society too loses its traditional vertical 
structures and customary norms. Similarly, in post-Fordist production we 
experience a de-structuring of the organization of work that produce zones 
of indistinguishability. Consider, for instance, the unification of labor place 
and living space, the indiscernibility between labor time and non-labor time 
or between consumption and production, and the dissolving of a standard of 
measurement to remunerate immaterial work.49 
Our experiential dimension of life changes drastically as well. Think of 
the vast and always new choice of products available on the market and how 
consumerism solicits countless modes of self-realizations, lifestyles and so 
on. This technical use of pleasure is embedded in the very being of the modern 
individual and constructs life as a boundless, but private and serialized, field 
of experience. The chief consequence here is that the notion of desire has 
now collapsed in the function of enjoyment, which is private, repetitive and 
excessive as the subject disposes of the object of pleasure precisely as a 
thing.50 This is the libidinal face of post-Fordism; this is the lucrative disorder 
of the society of enjoyment. In the lack of measure of post-Fordism we 
perceive the thriving of an animalized form of jouissance, one that is caught in 
an obsessive circulation due to the lack of a symbolic intervention. 
49 Immaterial work implies the employment of all aspects of one’s personality and thus 
escapes the quantitative measurement used under Fordism: wage labor. Here one can see the 
two side of the problem: on the one hand the force and creativity of the new laborer, on the other 
the fact that the limited and exploitative dimension of wage labor constitutes the only safeguard 
against his or her starvation. 
50 See M. Recalcati, L’uomo senza inconscio: Figure della nuova clinica psicoanalítica, 
Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano, 2010, and Forme contemporanee del totalitarismo, Bollati 
Boringhieri, Torino, 2007.
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What happens to the thought of sexual difference in this context? This is 
a tough question because the theory of the Maternal Symbolic was elaborated 
in the wake of the patriarchal discourse and did not assess the techniques 
of power at work in post-Fordism. The problem is that these new economic 
mechanisms seem to reflect in a distorted way also some tenets of sexual 
difference. As Ida Dominijanni rightfully pointed out, the Maternal Symbolic 
cannot be thought as something monolithic, there is always a negative 
residuum that escapes and that “continuously needs to be reprocessed and 
reworked”51. The positive expression of the maternal does not erase the 
presence of what she calls a “trace or impression of the origin that always 
returns” and thus complicates the primary relationship with the matrix of life 
and desire.52 For one of the astonishing results of the affirmation of the theory 
of sexual difference is that “woman’s sexuality has progressively dissolved.” 
Paradoxically, she argues, “the more the mother became the sexed figure of 
the origin, of authority and of woman discourse, the more it de-sexualized 
herself”53. 
The question we need to ask is: what happened to the relation with the 
Other under post-Fordist biopolitical control of the masses? The eclipse 
of desire in favor of enjoyment and its compulsive pattern of repetition 
points toward the category of fixation that was central in Muraro’s analysis. 
Dominijanni gestures towards this issue when acknowledging that in post-
Fordism a shift occurs from the centrality of the hysteric figure to that of 
the anorexic. In her view, it is now the anorexic that bears testimony to a 
general disorder in our processes of symbolization. As she notes: “if the 
hysteria was the symptom that accompanied the women’s entrance into 
modernity, and to which feminism gave a political response, anorexia does 
not only represents the symptom of female resistance against postmodern 
hedonism and consumerism, but also the paradoxical and unforeseen effect of 
the […] symbolic revolution of women.”54 In what sense is anorexia replacing 
the hysteric position? Hysteria is tied to modernity as the latter is defined 
by the patriarchal order, where the absolute transparency and consistency 
of phallocentrism begins to falter but still keeps under control society. As 
we said, through the masquerade, women registered and gave form to the 
ontological reality of a saturated attachment to the mother as the object of 
love. Based on a strict exclusionary principle of order, the patriarchal order 
did not allow such dissent and thus forbid these comportments. In its extreme 
51 I. Dominjianni, “L’impronta indecidibile”, in L’ombra della madre, Diotima, Liguori 
Editore, Napoli, 2007, p. 180.
52 Ibidem.
53 Ibidem, p. 183.
54 Ibidem, p. 187.
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pathological form, hysteria is a neurosis caused by interdiction.This symptom 
cannot hold sway in today’s society of enjoyment, whose salient features 
are narratives that command systematic satisfaction instead of injunctions to 
defer and repress desires. In such a context, individuals are pushed to realize 
themselves under the command of enjoyment thus following patterns that are 
properly psychotic. In psychosis, in fact, the subject’s responses and actions 
are literally absorbed by the pressure of the Real, for the symbolic has lost 
its morphological capacity to structure reality. The postmodern individual 
thus lives in a hallucinatory dimension, where these hallucinations are 
manifestations of the Real. As Massimo Recalcati affirms, if in neurosis one 
can detect “a symbolic return of the Real repressed through the apparatuses 
of the subconscious, in psychosis there is a symbolic collapse and a return to 
the Real as such, without any symbolic mediation”55. Hence the fixation, the 
compulsive repetition typical of psychosis. 
The anorexic girl (but the same holds for the male) is caught in this 
psychotic loop, only she projects it on her body. Dominijanni argues that 
the anorexic is confronted by an overwhelming presence that she identifies 
with the figure of the mother: “The de-sexualized body of the anorexic” 
refuses the talking cure that was so effective with hysteria and “presents itself 
as an identitary datum, a return of the Real that cannot be symbolized”56. 
This residuum resists symbolization and seems to produce a “discontinuity 
from the maternal, a feminine difference from the mother that must be 
signified and given room to”57. It is in this conflicting relation with origin 
that we catch a glimpse of the heuristic potentiality of the anorexic in post-
Fordist psychopathology. On the one hand, she is the result of decades of 
struggles in which sexual difference wrestled its spaces of affirmation out 
of the masculine foreclosure. On the other, with her mute protest she also 
crops out the criticalities of the maternal continuum in the context of post-
Fordist dismeasure. The anorexic embodies a more critical position than 
other common psychotic figures of our time such as, for instance, the cocaine 
addict or the workaholic. Perfectly functional to the post-Fordist imperative of 
performance and self-entrepreneurship, both figures enthusiastically commit 
themselves to the pattern of reiteration while they dissipate and exhaust their 
being. On the contrary, the anorexic nightmare of the disciplinary control 
over the body implies sufferance and pain. These are evidences of a stubborn 
55 Recalcati, L’uomo senza inconscio, cit., p. 16. 
56 I. Dominjianni, “L’impronta indecidibile”, cit., p. 187. On the clinical significance of the 
anorexic see also M. Recalcati, Elogio del fallimento. Conversazioni su anoressie e disagio della 
giovinezza, Edizioni Erikson, Trento, 2011.
57 I. Dominjianni, “L’impronta indecidibile”, cit., p. 188.
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refusal; they are markers of an implicit unruliness to the injunction of 
enjoyment. 
If we look at the anorexic from a slightly different angle, beyond the return 
of the Real qua mother, we also perceive a dangerous attack to the category 
of fixation as an organizing principle. The circularity of the substitution-
restitution seems saturated by a movement that lost its capacity of mediation/
innovation. But isn’t this blockage again a symptom of the socio-economic 
transformations of post-Fordism? Isn’t this the effect of the technical 
organization of excess produced by immaterial work? In effect, a Post-Fordist 
society does not need a coherent structure of reference. Its key words are: 
deregulation, decentralization, flexibility but also social cooperation in the 
guise of the network based production. Thus neoliberalism recognizes the 
openness of the field and controls it horizontally and molecularly, from 
the inside of the very individuals that populate it. Through a compulsive 
reiteration to work and consume more psychotic comportments proliferate that 
internalizes this form of control as former restrictions or limitations –among 
which basic social rights typical of a liberal democracy– are progressively 
dissolved. 
So psychosis is not an individual pathology: it is the whole socio-
economic infrastructure that organizes it. Consider, for example, a common 
trait of our life: self-exploitation. This phenomenon is tied to the passage from 
the Fordist figure of the wage-worker to the post-Fordist notion of human 
capital and immaterial labor. Here, the worker –leaving behind rights and the 
infrastructure guarantying personal social services– is supposed to prosper 
in the market by realizing his or her full potentiality58. As Andrea Fumagalli 
notes “the self-employed worker subsumes wage laborer and entrepreneur: 
his remuneration is strictly dependent from the self-exploitation of his or 
her laboring skills and from the negotiating power that the latter has on the 
market”59. Be it a lucky and prosperous enterprise or a less fortunate one, 
one which struggles daily with precarious incomes, the self-employed worker 
needs continuously to invest on him or herself developing skills, knowledge, 
capacities as if they were economic assets. Alienation here seems to disappear 
as the worker comes into being precisely by profiting from his or her own 
valorization. Yet this also means that labor becomes indistinguishable from 
non-labor, from life. Obviously this merging engenders an inexhaustible 
dynamism, an excess. Post-Fordism feeds on this excess and cannibalizes it 
by inciting laboring practices that ultimately expropriates –the financialization 
58 See M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p. 229.
59 A. Fumagalli, Bioeconomia e capitalismo cognitivo. Verso un nuovo paradigma di acco-
mulazione, Carocci, Roma, 2007, p. 142.
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of real economy (its speculation and cyclical crisis) is but the most blatant 
example60. Thus self-realization blurs into mere survival; efficiency and 
performance lead to the dissolution of bodily and mental energies. Therein 
the immaterial laborer assumes onto him or herself an unlimited form of 
command that follows a psychotic behavior. 
Neoliberalism foments and disciplines our present dismeasure and 
disaggregation producing a final form of dissipation which impacts the 
human, but also the social and certainly the ecological life of the planet –if we 
consider our pending environmental catastrophe. Thus the anorexic represents 
both the effect and the critique of this short-circuits. In other words, she is a 
symptom. In her challenge one can detect the contours of a future “subject of 
difference that emerges –not by accident– with the decline of the identitarian 
subject, accelerat[ing] the deconstruction and crisis of the latter without 
nihilistic or auto-annihilating results”61. 
In this sense, Ida Dominijanni tries to impress a new turn to the thought 
a sexual difference, one that echoes Esposito idea of internal rotation. After 
the reactivation of the fault plane of life through a critical elaboration –in our 
case the maternal symbolic– one must “work on its internal rotation: turning 
it from a defense barrier against the external to a differential procedure that 
transforms that which it identifies.”62 Hence if Luisa Muraro, especially in 
her L’ordine simbolico della madre, deploys sexual difference through the 
recovery of the fullness of the maternal continuum, in the society of enjoyment 
the latter must undergo a new torsion, one in which fullness assumes on itself 
its radically differential and self-reflexive premises. This implies reinforcing 
the idea that sexual difference is to be conceived as a productive practice that 
gets re-signified in the collective dimension of today’s society. In addition, 
the chain of substitution-restitution must reinvigorate its circulatory and 
generative capacity avoiding relapses in a saturated restitution of the mother 
while simultaneously creating order. 
As we said Post-Fordism exploits the excess of social cooperation 
intensively and internally, for it works through the psychotic drive to a self-
consuming recursivity. The problem is to give measure to the immeasurable 
respecting its ethic, in other words finding a distribution that connects two 
side of the same question: the finite of singularity and the infinite spectrum of 
60 See C. Marazzi, “The Violence of Financial Capital”, in A. Fumagalli (ed.), Crisis 
in the Global Economy: Financial Markets, Social Struggles, and New Political Scenarios, 
Semiotext(e), Los Angeles 2010. On the exploitative dimension of immaterial labor in itself see 
M. Paquinelli, Animal Spirits: A Bestiary of the Commons, NAi Publishers / Institute of Network 
Cultures, Rotterdam, 2008. 
61 I. Dominjianni, “Heiresses at Twilight,” The commoner 11 (2006), p. 102.
62 R. Esposito, op. cit., p. 250.
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its variation. This would be the eternally contingent and historically concrete 
fixture of a new concept of fixation. This is why Dominijanni warns that the 
real concrete mother, the source of love but also conflict and pain, will never 
be completely subsumed by the maternal continuum. It is important to keep 
that singular person in front of us and continue to interrogate and renegotiate 
our specific relationship with her. This emphasis on the concrete, historical 
condition of the maternal is also a response to the de-sexualization of the 
mother. Hence Dominijanni urges to take into account the father as well. What 
is the economy of desire that relates him to the mother and the daughter? 
How do we re-signify these relationships in the context of the faltering of 
patriarchal figures of power?
At a theoretical level the materiality of sexual difference must be 
safeguarded as well. Hence sexual difference must play itself out so that its 
“undecidable” nature, its being an “imprint” more than a symbol, becomes a 
reflexive supplement63. Somewhere Lacan said that the unconscious lives in 
the temporality of the not yet. The interval between the now of the symptom, 
its origin and its meaning, allows us to dispose of it as a manifestation, as 
an always looming possibility for the emergence of a singularity. Doesn’t 
this virtual dimension offer the most productive way to think the presentness 
of origin in our life, to project the constituent capacity of beginning into 
the architectonic of the now? This is the sort of reflective difference that 
Dominijanni calls “Venus strabismus.” Hence we should “keep a sort 
of cross-eyed view on the present, both on the best and the worst of our 
present,” because this distorted perspective “can preserve us from delusions 
of omnipotence and from considering female freedom as a progressive or 
definitive conquest, which is not subjected, like it indeed is, to counterthrusts, 
backlashes, regressions”64. 
This is a good methodological tip. It’s an example of good dialectic, one 
that men should entertain as well as they discuss how to re-negotiate their 
masculinity and their desire in light of the decay of the symbolic order and the 
rise of psychotic forms of enjoyment. Men too should begin by recognizing 
the distinguishing traits of their symptomatology. And while performing this 
analytical work, we should all remember the structural connection that binds 
the symbolic to the economic: men and women alike. If, in fact, contemporary 
capitalism puts to work our bios –i.e. our corporeal and psychic dimension– it 
is there that political practices should uncover the potentials for tomorrow’s 
decisive conflicts. I believe the key question that still remains open for both 
sexes is how to overturn the biopolitical ordering of excess in our society. In 
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64 I. Dominjianni, “Venus’s Strabismus. Looking at the Crisis of Politics from the Politics 
of Difference”, Iris 2 (2010), p. 182.
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other words, how to re-appropriate the potentiality of dismeasure developing 
the promises of freedom it lodges. It is, once again, the old Marxist question 
of how to turn forms of vassalage into triggers of liberation. 
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